Pregnancy; dismissal; dismissing a woman because she is unavailable due to pregnancy is sex discrimination. That was the ruling of the ECJ on the reference made by the House of Lords at [1993] ICR 175: Lord Keith's speech there had reasoned that the relevant circumstance was unavailability for work and that the reason for it was not relevant. The House applied the ECJ's ruling when the case returned ([1995] ICR 1021). [Summary checked against a practitioner text, not the judgment.]
Status; the Supreme Court established that tribunals must look at the 'reality of the situation' and disregard sham contract clauses.
“So the relative bargaining power of the parties must be taken into account in deciding whether the terms of any written agreement in truth represent what was agreed and the true agreement will often have to be gleaned from all the circumstances of the case, of which the written agreement is only a part.”Lord Clarke, at [35]
Cited by
References found in the judgments’ text, with the number of paragraphs in which each case is mentioned. Not a classification: how a case was treated is recorded under Later history.
Employment status; dancer; economic risk. The Court of Appeal held that the tribunal had been fully entitled to find that a lap dancer was not an employee [55]. The most important finding was that the club was under no obligation to pay her anything: she negotiated her own fees with clients and took the risk of being out of pocket on any night [45]. The club did not employ the dancers to dance; they paid it for the opportunity to earn money by dancing for its clients [50]. That the dancer took the economic risk was a very powerful pointer against a contract of employment, though the court did not go so far as to hold that without an obligation to pay a wage there can never be one [51]. The parties' own treatment of her as self-employed reinforced the conclusion [52]-[53].
Cited by
References found in the judgments’ text, with the number of paragraphs in which each case is mentioned. Not a classification: how a case was treated is recorded under Later history.
Limb (b) worker status; LLP member; whistleblowing. A solicitor member of an LLP was a limb (b) worker under s.230(3)(b) ERA 1996 and could bring a protected disclosure detriment claim. The Supreme Court held there is no freestanding subordination requirement for limb (b) status: the statutory question is whether the individual undertakes to perform work personally for a party who is not their client or customer.
Cited by
References found in the judgments’ text, with the number of paragraphs in which each case is mentioned. Not a classification: how a case was treated is recorded under Later history.
Employment status; worker; personal service; substitution. The Supreme Court dismissed Pimlico's appeal, so that a plumber's claims as a limb (b) worker could proceed [50]. He had presented himself as self-employed for income tax and VAT [42]. The tribunal was entitled to hold that the dominant feature of his contracts was an obligation of personal performance [34]. His only right of substitution was of another Pimlico operative [27]. That limitation was significant: the substitute had to be bound to Pimlico by the same heavy obligations [34]. Features of the contract strongly militated against Pimlico being his client or customer: tight control through its uniform, branded van, identity card and control room instructions, with covenants restricting his work after termination [48]. The tribunal was entitled, by a reasonable margin, so to conclude [49]. The holiday-pay sequel is Smith v Pimlico Plumbers Ltd (No 2) [2022] EWCA Civ 70, entered separately.
Cited by
Cites
References found in the judgments’ text, with the number of paragraphs in which each case is mentioned. Not a classification: how a case was treated is recorded under Later history.
Status; worker; drivers were workers while the app was on, due to control and subordination.
“Critical to understanding the Autoclenz case, as I see it, is that the rights asserted by the claimants were not contractual rights but were created by legislation. Thus, the task for the tribunals and the courts was not, unless the legislation required it, to identify whether, under the terms of their contracts, Autoclenz had agreed that the claimants should be paid at least the national minimum wage or receive paid annual leave. It was to determine whether the claimants fell within the definition of a “worker” in the relevant statutory provisions so as to qualify for these rights irrespective of what had been contractually agreed. In short, the primary question was one of statutory interpretation, not contractual interpretation.”Lord Leggatt, at [69]
Cited by
Cites
References found in the judgments’ text, with the number of paragraphs in which each case is mentioned. Not a classification: how a case was treated is recorded under Later history.
Limb (b) worker status; associate dentist; personal service; substitution. The tribunal erred in finding an associate dentist was not a worker: a heavily fettered substitution clause, permitting substitution only from a pre-approved pool in limited circumstances, did not negate personal service. The starting point is the purposive statutory test, not shorthand glosses or the labels the contract adopts.
Cites
References found in the judgments’ text, with the number of paragraphs in which each case is mentioned. Not a classification: how a case was treated is recorded under Later history.
Worker Status; substitution clause; trade union recognition; Article 11 ECHR. The appeal proceeded on the basis that the Riders were not workers under s.296 TULRCA 1992: the issue was whether they were in an employment relationship for the trade union rights in Article 11 [8], [10]. That is an autonomous concept, applied through a multifactorial test that looks at how the relationship operates in reality [61]. The Riders' virtually unfettered right to appoint a substitute was, on its face, totally inconsistent with an obligation of personal service, which is essential to an Article 11 employment relationship [69]. The CAC was entitled to find that the contractual provisions genuinely reflected the true relationship [70]. The Riders were therefore outside Article 11 [73]. In any event Article 11 confers no right to compulsory collective bargaining [139]. The appeal was dismissed [74], [142].
Cites
References found in the judgments’ text, with the number of paragraphs in which each case is mentioned. Not a classification: how a case was treated is recorded under Later history.
Employment status; shareholder-director of a family farming company and his wife, a de facto director, found not to be employees or workers. Employment tribunal, first instance, not binding. The ET applied the PMOL framework [5] and, looking only at the work not referable to the director or shareholder roles [18]-[19], concluded: no control exercised by the respondent over the claimants' work [20]; substitution was possible and occurred in practice [21]; the labelling of payments as employment was a paper exercise on accountants' advice, and the payments were more closely aligned with directors' drawings than employment earnings [22], [26]; no intention to create an employment relationship [28]. The absence of an obligation of personal service was fatal to the limb (b) worker claim [31]. All claims were dismissed [32]. EAT refused appeal at sift, no arguable error of law.
Status (Dutch law); classification of an arbeidsovereenkomst (art 7:610 BW) depends on all circumstances of the case viewed in connection; nine circumstances listed, including embedding of the work in the organisation and whether the worker behaves or can behave as an entrepreneur in economic life. Deliveroo riders were employees.
Employment status; mutuality of obligation; control; part-time football referees. Mutuality of obligation is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of a contract of employment [57]. A single engagement, such as officiating at one match, can be a contract of employment: mutual obligations need not exist before the engagement begins [49], [53]-[54]. Control requires a sufficient framework of control for each contract taken separately [66], [73]: a contractual right to direct the manner in which the work is done, enforceable by an effective sanction, which may be one imposed after the engagement has ended [82], [88].
Cites
References found in the judgments’ text, with the number of paragraphs in which each case is mentioned. Not a classification: how a case was treated is recorded under Later history.
Employment status; unfair prejudice; quasi-partnership. HHJ Matthews found that shareholder-directors of a family farming company were employees, despite the ET having found the opposite on largely the same facts. The High Court applied the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn (recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Evans v Barclays Bank plc [2025] UKSC 48) to hold the ET's findings inadmissible, and reached its own conclusion based on documentary evidence including accounts, P60s, bank records, and termination letters. Weekly payments held to be wages, not directors' drawings.
Cites
References found in the judgments’ text, with the number of paragraphs in which each case is mentioned. Not a classification: how a case was treated is recorded under Later history.