Discrimination; gender reassignment; rejection of a trans woman was unlawful. [Summary not yet checked against the judgment.]
Discrimination; gender reassignment; toilet facilities during transition. The Court of Appeal (Pill, Jonathan Parker and Keene LJJ) held that an employer did not unlawfully discriminate under s.2A of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 by requiring an employee at the start of her real life test to use a unisex disabled toilet rather than the female facilities. Presenting as a woman does not of itself confer a right to use women's toilets; the tribunal must judge when the employee has become entitled to be treated as a woman, giving weight to her self-definition without being bound by it [47]-[49]. The comparators are non-transsexual employees of either sex, and a temporary requirement to use separate facilities was not less favourable treatment [74]-[76]. The employer must respect the employee's dignity and both sides must act reasonably to overcome the difficulties [52]. Decided before the Gender Recognition Act 2004 and the Equality Act 2010.
Discrimination; gender reassignment; direct discrimination; genuine occupational qualification. The House of Lords held that refusing to appoint a post-operative trans woman as a police constable was unlawful direct sex discrimination. Read in the light of P v S and Cornwall County Council and Goodwin v United Kingdom, the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 required a person who had undergone gender reassignment to be treated as being of the acquired gender, so the genuine occupational qualification relied on, the need for officers to search suspects of their own sex, could not justify the refusal. [Summary not yet checked against the judgment.]
Sex; meaning of 'woman' in the Equality Act 2010; gender recognition certificates. The Inner House dismissed For Women Scotland's appeal from the Outer House and upheld the Scottish Ministers' statutory guidance, under which a person with a gender recognition certificate recognising their gender as female is a woman for the purposes of the 2010 Act and of the Gender Representation on Public Boards (Scotland) Act 2018. Reversed by the Supreme Court, [2025] UKSC 16, which held that 'sex' and 'woman' in the 2010 Act refer to biological sex. [Summary not yet checked against the judgment.]
Reversed by For Women Scotland Ltd v Scottish Ministers [2025] UKSC 16 (2025-04-16)
Harassment; trans woman's use of female changing room; conflict between sex and gender reassignment. Employment tribunal (Scotland), first instance, not binding. For Women Scotland did not make the employer's permission for a trans woman doctor to use the female changing room necessarily unlawful [789]. The tribunal resolved the conflict between protected characteristics by the Bank Mellat proportionality test, the burden being on the employer [920]-[922]. The permission was lawful at first and once rotas were separated, but not from 16 September 2023 to 13 April 2024, when it should have been revoked on an interim basis: her perception of harassment on two occasions in that period was reasonable [936], [964]-[965]. The board also harassed her, related to belief, by the unreasonable length of its investigation, a reference to patient care allegations and an instruction not to discuss the case [1149]. Direct and indirect discrimination, victimisation and the claim against the doctor personally were dismissed [1172], [1220], [1224], [1263].
Discrimination; toilets; access policy based on asserted gender identity. Employment tribunal (Scotland), first instance, not binding. The claimant complained that permitting trans women to use the female toilets was harassment, direct and indirect sex discrimination [2]. Harassment failed: the policy was unwanted conduct related to sex, but it had no practical effect on the claimant and it was not reasonable for it to have the proscribed effect, although such a policy could have that effect on other facts [294], [297]. Direct discrimination failed: the comparator was a man whose male toilets were used by a trans man, and the policy applied equally to men and women [306], [318]. Indirect discrimination failed for want of group or individual disadvantage [347], [353]; in the alternative any disadvantage was minor and the policy was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim [379]-[380]. The respondent had complied with reg 20 of the Workplace (Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulations 1992 [240]. Complaints dismissed [382].
Equality Act; definition of 'sex'; confirmed that 'sex' in the Equality Act 2010 refers to biological sex.