The mechanisms restraining vexatious litigation in the tribunal system, each a permission filter rather than a bar. Attorney General v Barker; Nursing and Midwifery Council v Harrold.
Procedure; vexatious litigants; Lord Bingham CJ defined the hallmarks of vexatious proceedings: little or no basis in law, the effect of subjecting the defendant to inconvenience, harassment and expense out of all proportion to any likely gain, and an abuse of the process of the court. The essential vice of habitual and persistent litigation is 'keeping on and on litigating when earlier litigation has been unsuccessful and when on any rational and objective assessment the time has come to stop'. [Summary checked against a practitioner text, not the judgment.]
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References found in the judgments’ text, with the number of paragraphs in which each case is mentioned. Not a classification: how a case was treated is recorded under Later history.
Civil restraint orders; vexatious litigants; High Court's inherent jurisdiction over employment tribunal proceedings. On a threshold issue in a Part 8 claim for a CRO against a former nurse who had brought a series of tribunal claims, Hamblen J held that the High Court has inherent jurisdiction to make a CRO covering proceedings before the employment tribunal [4], [7], [37]. The CPR power reaches only the High Court and County Court, because a tribunal is not a court for the purposes of CPR 3.11 [13]. The tribunal is an inferior court with no power to make such an order itself: protecting it is an instance of the High Court's power to prevent interference with the due course of justice in inferior courts [20]. Law Society v Otobo was followed [36]. The tribunal's own strike-out, deposit and costs powers are no substitute: none prevents proceedings being brought [32]. Whether to make an order on the facts was left over [37].
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References found in the judgments’ text, with the number of paragraphs in which each case is mentioned. Not a classification: how a case was treated is recorded under Later history.
Procedure; civil proceedings order; an ET claim brought without the permission required under a CPO is a nullity and of no effect. The reference in S.42(3) SCA 1981 to 'leave for the continuance of any civil proceedings' is limited to proceedings instituted before the making of the CPO, it does not permit retrospective validation of proceedings commenced in breach.
Civil restraint orders; vexatious litigants; High Court's inherent jurisdiction over employment tribunal proceedings. On a threshold issue in a Part 8 claim for a CRO against a former nurse who had brought a series of tribunal claims, Hamblen J held that the High Court has inherent jurisdiction to make a CRO covering proceedings before the employment tribunal [4], [7], [37]. The CPR power reaches only the High Court and County Court, because a tribunal is not a court for the purposes of CPR 3.11 [13]. The tribunal is an inferior court with no power to make such an order itself: protecting it is an instance of the High Court's power to prevent interference with the due course of justice in inferior courts [20]. Law Society v Otobo was followed [36]. The tribunal's own strike-out, deposit and costs powers are no substitute: none prevents proceedings being brought [32]. Whether to make an order on the facts was left over [37].
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References found in the judgments’ text, with the number of paragraphs in which each case is mentioned. Not a classification: how a case was treated is recorded under Later history.
Procedure; civil restraint orders; the High Court's inherent jurisdiction reaches the employment tribunal. Elisabeth Laing J made a general civil restraint order against a former nurse who had brought fifteen claims against her former employer and the NMC, most in the tribunal and many totally without merit, repeatedly re-litigating issues already decided against her [132], [136]. The order, for the maximum two years, restrains her from bringing claims against either claimant in the county court, the tribunal or the High Court without permission, and takes in the two tribunal claims then stayed; her pending appeal from the NMC's decision was excluded [138]. Hamblen J had earlier held that the court has power to restrain tribunal proceedings ([2015] EWHC 2254 (QB)) [2]. Tribunals were invited to record whether a weak claim is totally without merit, so that a later application of this kind has the specialist tribunal's view [139].
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Cites
References found in the judgments’ text, with the number of paragraphs in which each case is mentioned. Not a classification: how a case was treated is recorded under Later history.
Malicious prosecution of civil proceedings. On appeal from the striking out of the claim [2], the Supreme Court held by a majority that the tort of malicious prosecution extends to the prosecution of civil proceedings: the countervailing policy considerations did not outweigh the argument that simple justice required the claim to be sustainable [57]. The claimant must prove both absence of reasonable and probable cause and malice, meaning that the proceedings were not a bona fide use of the court's process: a heavy burden [55]-[56]. Lord Toulson allowed the claim for the excess of legal expenditure over costs recovered to go to trial: the notion that the standard-basis costs order had made good the injury 'is almost certainly a fiction' [58]-[59]. Such a claim would have been an abuse of process, as a collateral attack, had a judge refused indemnity costs after a full trial [58]. Appeal allowed [59]; Lords Neuberger, Mance, Sumption and Reed dissented [146], [173], [181], [182].
Civil restraint orders; general CRO restraining employment tribunal claims; Nowak questions. Stacey J made a two-year general civil restraint order against a former employee who had brought ten unsuccessful tribunal claims, restraining claims in the ET, EAT, county court and High Court without a specified judge's permission [2], [77]. The power is the High Court's inherent power recognised in NMC v Harrold, exercised by analogy with Practice Direction 3C, since the ET and EAT rules contain no power to restrain litigation [35], [37]. The three Nowak questions were applied [41]. Six EAT appeals and one Court of Appeal application certified totally without merit were binding and met the threshold [51]. A general order is not to be made merely for want of court proceedings to which an extended order could attach [68], but an extended order would be insufficient on the facts [69], [73]. The order was a permission filter and a proportionate interference with Article 6 rights [76].
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Cites
References found in the judgments’ text, with the number of paragraphs in which each case is mentioned. Not a classification: how a case was treated is recorded under Later history.
Civil restraint orders; general CRO restraining employment tribunal claims; Nowak questions. Stacey J made a two-year general civil restraint order against a former employee who had brought ten unsuccessful tribunal claims, restraining claims in the ET, EAT, county court and High Court without a specified judge's permission [2], [77]. The power is the High Court's inherent power recognised in NMC v Harrold, exercised by analogy with Practice Direction 3C, since the ET and EAT rules contain no power to restrain litigation [35], [37]. The three Nowak questions were applied [41]. Six EAT appeals and one Court of Appeal application certified totally without merit were binding and met the threshold [51]. A general order is not to be made merely for want of court proceedings to which an extended order could attach [68], but an extended order would be insufficient on the facts [69], [73]. The order was a permission filter and a proportionate interference with Article 6 rights [76].
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Cites
References found in the judgments’ text, with the number of paragraphs in which each case is mentioned. Not a classification: how a case was treated is recorded under Later history.
Procedure; civil proceedings order; the Court of Appeal confirmed that a claim brought in breach of a CPO under S.42 SCA 1981 is a nullity, not merely susceptible to being struck out but void ab initio. Retrospective permission cannot cure proceedings commenced without the required leave. The nullity principle applies equally to employment tribunal claims.
Cites
References found in the judgments’ text, with the number of paragraphs in which each case is mentioned. Not a classification: how a case was treated is recorded under Later history.
Procedure; civil proceedings order; the Court of Appeal confirmed that a claim brought in breach of a CPO under S.42 SCA 1981 is a nullity, not merely susceptible to being struck out but void ab initio. Retrospective permission cannot cure proceedings commenced without the required leave. The nullity principle applies equally to employment tribunal claims.
Cites
References found in the judgments’ text, with the number of paragraphs in which each case is mentioned. Not a classification: how a case was treated is recorded under Later history.
Procedure; vexatious litigants; the EAT granted a restriction of proceedings order under S.33 ETA 1996 against a litigant who had brought over 50 ET claims since 2017, none succeeding. The order requires EAT permission before instituting or continuing any proceedings. The EAT declined to restrict the respondent from acting as a representative, S.33 only covers proceedings instituted by the named person, unlike S.42 SCA 1981 which extends to proceedings 'by him or another'.
Cites
References found in the judgments’ text, with the number of paragraphs in which each case is mentioned. Not a classification: how a case was treated is recorded under Later history.
Procedure; vexatious litigants; the EAT granted a restriction of proceedings order under S.33 ETA 1996 against a litigant who had brought over 50 ET claims since 2017, none succeeding. The order requires EAT permission before instituting or continuing any proceedings. The EAT declined to restrict the respondent from acting as a representative, S.33 only covers proceedings instituted by the named person, unlike S.42 SCA 1981 which extends to proceedings 'by him or another'.
Cites
References found in the judgments’ text, with the number of paragraphs in which each case is mentioned. Not a classification: how a case was treated is recorded under Later history.