Whistleblowing; good faith; (Historic) disclosures made with an ulterior motive (personal antagonism) were not protected. [Summary not yet checked against the judgment.]
Cited by
References found in the judgments’ text, with the number of paragraphs in which each case is mentioned. Not a classification: how a case was treated is recorded under Later history.
Whistleblowing; a worker can make a protected disclosure even if their belief in the wrongdoing is mistaken, provided it is reasonable.
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Cites
References found in the judgments’ text, with the number of paragraphs in which each case is mentioned. Not a classification: how a case was treated is recorded under Later history.
Whistleblowing; unfair dismissal; burden of proof as to the reason for dismissal. The legal burden of proving the reason for dismissal rests on the employer throughout, and it is for the employer to show that the reason was not the protected disclosure. The employee bears only an evidential burden: it is enough for her to challenge the employer's evidence and to produce some evidence of a different reason. The tribunal is not obliged to accept the reason advanced by either party, and rejecting the employer's reason does not compel a finding that the disclosure was the reason.
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References found in the judgments’ text, with the number of paragraphs in which each case is mentioned. Not a classification: how a case was treated is recorded under Later history.
Whistleblowing; causation; the disclosure need only 'materially influence' the employer's negative treatment (s.47B).
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Cites
References found in the judgments’ text, with the number of paragraphs in which each case is mentioned. Not a classification: how a case was treated is recorded under Later history.
Whistleblowing; public interest; a disclosure affecting a small group (e.g. 100 managers) satisfies the 'public interest' test.
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Cites
References found in the judgments’ text, with the number of paragraphs in which each case is mentioned. Not a classification: how a case was treated is recorded under Later history.
Whistleblowing; personal liability; a 'composite approach' to liability under s.47B(1A) ERA 1996 is impermissible, the knowledge and motivation of one employee cannot be attributed to an innocent decision-maker to establish personal liability. Reynolds v CLFIS applied to the whistleblowing detriment regime. [Summary not yet checked against the judgment.]
Whistleblowing; s.47B(2) ERA 1996. An employee may sue a co-worker under s.47B(1A) for the detriment of dismissal, meaning for being a party to the decision to dismiss, and the employer under s.47B(1B) for that act; s.47B(2) excludes only a claim against the employer for its own act of dismissal (Underhill LJ at [91]). Two directors, Mr Timis (the largest shareholder), who decided on the CEO's dismissal, and Mr Sage (the chairman), who agreed to it and sent the email, were held jointly and severally liable with the company [1]. Followed with reluctance in Rice v Wicked Vision Ltd [2025] EWCA Civ 1466; whether Osipov was rightly decided is before the Supreme Court (UKSC 2026/0005, heard 21 May 2026). [Summary not yet checked against the judgment.]
“It is open to an employee to bring a claim under section 47B(1A) against an individual co-worker for subjecting him or her to the detriment of dismissal, i.e. for being a party to the decision to dismiss; and to bring a claim of vicarious liability for that act against the employer under section 47B(1B). All that section 47B(2) excludes is a claim against the employer in respect of its own act of dismissal.”Underhill LJ, at [91]
Doubted by Rice v Wicked Vision Ltd [2025] EWCA Civ 1466 (2025-11-14)
The Court of Appeal held itself bound by Osipov but said it would have departed from it if free to do so.
Under review Wicked Vision Ltd v Rice UKSC/2026/0005 (heard 21 May 2026)
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Cites
References found in the judgments’ text, with the number of paragraphs in which each case is mentioned. Not a classification: how a case was treated is recorded under Later history.
Whistleblowing; unfair dismissal; if a manager determines the decision to dismiss by hiding the truth (manipulation), that reason is attributed to the employer.
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Cites
References found in the judgments’ text, with the number of paragraphs in which each case is mentioned. Not a classification: how a case was treated is recorded under Later history.
Whistleblowing; separability; a dismissal can be for the manner of the disclosure (unreasonable conduct/behavior) rather than the disclosure itself.
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Cites
References found in the judgments’ text, with the number of paragraphs in which each case is mentioned. Not a classification: how a case was treated is recorded under Later history.
Whistleblowing; compensation; contracting out. An award exceeding GBP 1.6m was upheld. A contractual provision purporting to cap net damages at GBP 270,000 could not be given effect: the statutory restrictions on contracting out apply, and the tribunal did not err in declining to treat the cap as limiting what was just and equitable. Contains at [34]-[35] a review of Courage Take Home Trade Ltd v Keys, about the reasoning of which HHJ Auerbach recorded misgivings. [Summary not yet checked against the judgment.]
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Cites
References found in the judgments’ text, with the number of paragraphs in which each case is mentioned. Not a classification: how a case was treated is recorded under Later history.
Whistleblowing; s.47B(2) exclusion; dismissal as detriment. The EAT (Bourne J, [2024] EAT 29) held an employee could not amend to claim against the employer under s.47B(1A)/(1B) for the detriment of dismissal effected by a co-worker: s.47B(2) routes dismissal complaints to s.103A. Conflicted with Treadwell v Barton Turns and was reversed by the Court of Appeal in Rice v Wicked Vision [2025] EWCA Civ 1466 (bound by Timis v Osipov).
Reversed by Rice v Wicked Vision Ltd [2025] EWCA Civ 1466 (2025-11-14)
Cites
References found in the judgments’ text, with the number of paragraphs in which each case is mentioned. Not a classification: how a case was treated is recorded under Later history.
Whistleblowing; confidentiality; being a whistleblower does not justify misappropriation or retention of employer's documents post-termination.
Whistleblowing; detriment; tainted information; causation. Jhuti's composite approach does not apply to detriment claims under s.47B ERA 1996: the tribunal examines only the mental processes of the individual decision-maker, and the knowledge or motivation of another cannot be attributed to an innocent decision-maker (Malik v Cenkos Securities affirmed). The distinction rests on the different statutory schemes: s.103A imposes liability on the employer alone, whereas s.47B exposes individual co-workers to personal liability. [Summary not yet checked against the judgment.]
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Cites
References found in the judgments’ text, with the number of paragraphs in which each case is mentioned. Not a classification: how a case was treated is recorded under Later history.
Whistleblowing; victimization found for disclosures made six years previously, showing the long tail of liability. [Summary not yet checked against the judgment.]
Cites
References found in the judgments’ text, with the number of paragraphs in which each case is mentioned. Not a classification: how a case was treated is recorded under Later history.
Whistleblowing; charity trustees; discussed whether trustees or volunteers can have 'worker' status for whistleblowing protection.
Cites
References found in the judgments’ text, with the number of paragraphs in which each case is mentioned. Not a classification: how a case was treated is recorded under Later history.
Whistleblowing; s.47B(2) ERA 1996; dismissal as detriment. The Court of Appeal held itself bound by Timis v Osipov: an employee who claims unfair dismissal under s.103A may also claim against the employer under s.47B(1B) for a co-worker's s.47B(1A) detriment of dismissal, and need not join the co-worker [89]-[90]. A direct claim against the employer under s.47B(1) for its own act of dismissal remains barred. Free to decide, the court would have departed from Osipov [4], reading s.47B(2) as excluding any detriment compensable under Part X [44]-[45]; it did not find the different causation tests or the absence of injury to feelings under Part X anomalous [81]. Heard with Barton Turns Developments Ltd v Treadwell. The Supreme Court heard the employer's appeal on 21 May 2026 (UKSC 2026/0005); judgment awaited. [Summary not yet checked against the judgment.]
“Had we been free to depart from that decision, which we are not, we would have done so, as we respectfully disagree with its interpretation of the legislation.”Peter Jackson LJ, Coulson LJ, Elisabeth Laing LJ, at [4]
Appeal pending Wicked Vision Ltd v Rice UKSC/2026/0005 (heard 21 May 2026)
Cites
References found in the judgments’ text, with the number of paragraphs in which each case is mentioned. Not a classification: how a case was treated is recorded under Later history.
Whistleblowing; heard with Rice v Wicked Vision Ltd. The employer's appeal was dismissed: bound by Timis v Osipov, the Court of Appeal held that s.47B(2) ERA 1996 did not bar an amendment claiming against the employer under s.47B(1B) for a co-worker's detriment of dismissal, though it would have held otherwise if free to [4], [101]. The Supreme Court heard the appeal in Rice on 21 May 2026; judgment awaited. [Summary not yet checked against the judgment.]
Cites
References found in the judgments’ text, with the number of paragraphs in which each case is mentioned. Not a classification: how a case was treated is recorded under Later history.
Whistleblowing; (1) composite liability under s.47B(1A) is impermissible, an innocent decision-maker cannot be held personally liable for the detriment of dismissal by attributing to them the tainted motivation of a manipulating colleague; (2) Jhuti does not apply to s.47B(1A) personal co-worker liability claims; (3) 'dismissed' under s.47B(1A) means the act of the person who actually dismissed, not action contributing to dismissal by another; (4) s.103A complaint remitted to tribunal to properly apply the Jhuti manipulation analysis.
“the Tribunal erred in law by applying Jhuti to the complaints made under sub-sections 47B(1A) and (1B). It follows that it erred in finding the first and third respondents responsible liable for those complaints.”Lord Fairley (President), at [52]
Cites
References found in the judgments’ text, with the number of paragraphs in which each case is mentioned. Not a classification: how a case was treated is recorded under Later history.
Whistleblowing; s.43D ERA; disclosure to former solicitor; lawful excuse to breach of confidence. The High Court held that (1) the whistleblowing regime provides a public interest defence to breach of confidence at common law, adopting Racing Partnership's lawful excuse analysis; (2) s.43D protection for disclosures made 'in the course of obtaining legal advice' is not restricted to qualified lawyers but extends to any person whom the worker believes is competent to provide legal advice; (3) protection turns on timing of the worker's reasonable belief: initial disclosure to the same recipient before belief formed was not protected, but subsequent disclosure after advice causing belief was protected; (4) disclosure to a non-legal third party was not protected where not made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. [Summary not yet checked against the judgment.]
“where disclosure is made in circumstances that fall within the definition of a "qualifying disclosure" for the whistleblowing regime then this can constitute "lawful excuse" for what would otherwise be "the unauthorised use of information" … I consider that this is a correct statement of law.”Mr Justice Sheldon, at [155]
Cites
References found in the judgments’ text, with the number of paragraphs in which each case is mentioned. Not a classification: how a case was treated is recorded under Later history.